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Forty-sixth session
Agenda items 19 and 98
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 12 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Portual to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the text of a communiqué of the Government of Portugal on the human rights situation in East Timor.

I would be grateful if you would kindly arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 19 and 98, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fernando REINO
Ambassador of Portugal
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué dated 12 November 1991 by the Government of Portugal on the human rights situation in East Timor

1. News emanating from East Timor and confirmed by international press agencies (namely, from Jakarta) indicates that this morning a massacre occurred in the Territory causing dozens of dead and wounded. According to these reports, Indonesian armed forces opened fire on a crowd, estimated at about 1,000 people, gathered near the cemetery of Santa Cruz to honour Sebastião Rangel, a victim of the Motael church incident.

2. An official Indonesian source, quoted by Associated Press, confirmed that 40 people were killed during the incident.

3. Not even the presence in Dili of the Special Rapporteur on Torture of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights acted as a deterrent for this appalling action.

4. On 28 October a grave incident took place in the church of Motael, Dili, in which the action of Indonesian soldiers, in circumstances still to be fully explained, led to the death of two Timorese youths, Sebastião Rangel and Afonso Henriques, and to the arrest of dozens of others. The death of these two youths was confirmed by the newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Amnesty International has launched an appeal asking for an immediate and impartial investigation of the circumstances that led to those deaths. Still unconfirmed reports indicate that other incidents have occurred in Maliana, Suai and Futumaca involving youths apparently seeking sanctuary in local churches. There is news of other recent deaths and arrests. Persecution of those suspected of organizing demonstrations during the now suspended parliamentary visit is also being reported.

5. The terrible precedents in the field of human rights in East Timor give us strong reason to fear that new violence and bloodshed may again take place at any moment. Last August, before the Special Committee on Decolonization, Amnesty International again alerted the United Nations to the fact that serious human rights violations keep being perpetrated in East Timor, seeing that practices such as short-term detentions accompanied by torture and ill-treatment of suspected opponents of Indonesian rule, extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" had been intensified. At least 30 persons, and "possibly several more", that organization said, were killed by the Indonesian security forces in 1990 and in the first months of 1991 in apparent extrajudicial executions.

6. Portugal, for its part, has systematically denounced this situation, which ineluctably derives from the still unresolved question of the decolonization of East Timor, whose people has been deprived of exercising its right to self-determination, owing to the Republic of Indonesia's persistent illegal occupation, ever since its all-out military invasion of the Territory on 7 December 1975.

7. The Government of Portugal expresses its strongest condemnation of this new act of utmost brutality committed by the Indonesian Armed Forces against a defenceless civilian crowd, in disregard of basic principles of respect for human life.

8. It is time for the international community to heed the pressing calls for urgent action coming out of East Timor demanding that an end be put to this intolerable situation.

9. It will be recalled that one of the permanent objectives of Portuguese policy on East Timor, a Non-Self-Governing Territory under the administration of Portugal, illegally occupied by the Republic of Indonesia, has been, and will continue to be, the defence of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its inhabitants, denied during the occupation on a scale that is, proportionally, one of this century's gravest.

10. The denouncement of the situation in the Territory has been constant in several international instances, coming from countries, humanitarian organizations, petitioners from various quarters and from Timorese victims of human rights violations themselves. The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights keep eloquent records in this regard. Institutions such as the European Parliament, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the African Caribbean and Pacific States/European Community Consultative Assembly, to mention just a few, have lately conducted debates and have approved resolutions on the question of East Timor, which denounce the systematic human rights violations occurring in the Territory.

11. In spite of the difficulties that prevent access to what is happening in East Timor, namely, in the field of human rights, the information that reaches the outside, through various channels, allows for the conclusion that the general situation prevailing in the Territory has seriously worsened, especially in the last few weeks.

12. Against what was established in last June's agreement on the terms of reference of the Portuguese parliamentary visit to the Territory (which should have begun on 3 November), allowing for the freedom and spontaneity of contacts of the delegation with the population, Indonesian authorities conducted a campaign of terror and intimidation destined to prevent such contacts. The said campaign included the reinforcement of the security (omnipresent and infiltrated among the population) and military structures; surveillance and denoucement actions; forced attendance of the population at meetings during which any who meant to contact the parliamentary delegation were threatened; the intensification of questionings, tortures, arrests and "disappearances" of elements suspected of opposing Indonesian rule, and so on.

13. Dili's apostolic administrator himself, Monsignor Ximenes Belo, has courageously denounced this situation, revealing that the population was threatened with deadly reprisals after the departure of the delegation. Leaders of former Timorese politcial parties who had favoured the forced

annexation of East Timor by Indonesia have asked, like Monsignor Belo, for the presence of United Nations observers at the end of the parliamentary visit, so as to prevent such threats from being carried out.

14. It is unquestionable that all of this has led to a serious deterioration of the situation in the Territory, as well as to an atmosphere of great tension, which was generating fears, now confirmed, of the occurrence of a new wave of violations of human rights in East Timor.

15. A special responsibility in this regard is incumbent on the United Nations, whose basic principles and resolutions, including those of the Security Council, have been systematically violated by Indonesia, in blatant contempt for its authority.

16. Portugal thus appeals to all States and organizations to:

(a) Condemn this new massive violation of human rights against the East Timorese people, victim of a long-protracted denial of its basic human rights and freedoms, deriving from the continuing illegal occupation of their Territory by Indonesia, in disregard of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;

(b) Bring pressure to bear on the Government of Indonesia to put an immediate end to its illegal occupation of East Timor and to the inhuman repression being waged against its people;

(c) Demand an impartial, thorough and internationally supervised investigation of this highly regrettable incident, and that access to the Territory be given to humanitarian non-governmental organizations;

(d) Monitor closely any developments in the field of human rights in East Timor, so as to prevent further bloodshed and violence from occurring.

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2 December 1991
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LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the United States Air Force continues to violate Iraqi airspace. The relevant information is set forth hereunder.

19-20 November 1991

Twenty-six sorties, flown by 13 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,500 to 8,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Mosul, Tall'afar, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

At 0850 hours, two F-111s overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 500 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 500 metres.

Between 0705 and 1150 hours, 4 two-aircraft formations of F-111s, F-16s and Tornadoes overflew Faruq airfield at speeds of 500 to 700 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 30 to 1,000 metres.

20-21 November 1991

Twenty-eight sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations and four single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 950 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 5,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Dukan.

21-22 November 1991

Twenty sorties, flown by 10 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,500 to 4,000 metres, centred over Irbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Zakho, Tall'afar and Ayn Zalah.

22-23 November 1991

Twenty-one sorties, flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 750 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 18,000 metres, centred over Irbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar, Amadiyah and Zakho.

At 0810 hours, two F-111s overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 650 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 100 metres.

At 1150 hours, two F-16s overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 650 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 30 metres.

23-24 November 1991

Thirty-five sorties, flown by 17 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar, Rawanduz, Amadiyah, Zakho and Ayn Zalah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23260
2 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to place on record publicly our strong protest against the continued presence of five Iraqi police posts inside Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait has earlier communicated this protest to Major-General Gunther Greindl, Commander of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). In this connection, I should like to state the following:

1. Iraq claims that the posts had been in place before 2 August 1990. In fact, these five posts were established just before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ostensibly to monitor the Kuwaiti side in preparation for Iraq's aggression on 2 August 1990.

2. In spite of Kuwait's protestations through UNIKOM, Iraq refuses to pull back these posts, allegedly "because of the political implications". This stance clearly places Iraq in violation of the territorial sovereignty of Kuwait.

3. The rationale behind Iraq's intransigence is that the location of these police posts would be settled by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission. Without prejudice to the outcome of the Demarcation Commission's work, it is an established fact that the Iraqi posts are within Kuwaiti territory. The continued presence of these posts is an attempt by the Iraqi regime to present the Demarcation Commission with a fait accompli.

4. The continued presence of the Iraqi posts runs counter to the reasonable-distance principle of 1,000 metres from the boundary line shown on UNIKOM maps. This principle was set by UNIKOM to avoid frictions and incidents in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Iraq's refusal to abide by this principle is a clear violation of its commitment to facilitate the work of UNIKOM.

5. To claim that Iraqi police are under orders to avoid any clashes is but an attempt by the Iraqi regime to convey a position of cooperation and flexibility while it maintains its presence on Kuwaiti territory.

While lodging this protest, I am also instructed by my Government to demand the immediate dismantling of the five Iraqi police posts.

I should appreciate it if you would bring this letter to the immediate attention of the members of the Security Council and to arrange for its circulation as an official document of the Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23261
3 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With the Security Council currently reviewing the compliance by Iraq with its relevant resolutions, I am instructed by my Government to convey the following.

1. In connection with the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, Iraq continues to defy the terms of Security Council resolutions 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991. Not only is Iraq refusing immediate release and repatriation of these nationals, but it is also denying the International Committee of the Red Cross access to such persons "wherever located or detained" and not "facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third-country nationals still unaccounted for".

2. In connection with the Boundary Demarcation Commission, Iraq's position is far from being cooperative or constructive. To illustrate, Iraq's representative in the Demarcation Commission placed on record at the meeting held at Geneva on 16 August 1991 "Iraq's objection to the whole operation from its initiation because it does not achieve justice and equity to Iraq's territorial rights". Moreover, Iraq has refused to participate in the meeting of the technical committee of the Demarcation Commission held in Sweden on 19 and 20 August 1991. Iraq has further declined to participate in the work of the survey team of the Demarcation Commission visiting the DMZ area from 2 to 6 November 1991.

3. Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph 2 (d) of resolution 686 (1991) that Iraq immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, the return to be completed in the shortest possible period, Iraq has refused to return property seized from individuals and corporations. Furthermore, property returned so far has not all been intact. For example, property of the National Council for Culture, Art and Letters was found incomplete, and that of Kuwait News Agency is in large part seriously damaged.

4. Iraq is under obligation to cease hostile or provocative actions against Member States. Moreover, while it claims to be cooperating with the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, Iraq continues to maintain five police posts on Kuwaiti territory. Iraq's violation of the territorial sovereignty of Kuwait is further demonstrated by repeated Iraqi infiltrations into Kuwaiti territory.

Needless to say, the above-mentioned facts indicate that the "policies and practices of the Government of Iraq" are not in implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Clearly, what is required of Iraq is implementation in full of all relevant Security Council resolutions.

I should appreciate it if you would bring this letter to the immediate attention of the members of the Security Council, and arrange for its distribution as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23262
3 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 29 November 1991, the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe met at Prague for its fourth extraordinary session on the question of Yugoslavia and adopted a comprehensive resolution.

On behalf of the German Chairmanship of that Committee, I have the honour to enclose the text of the resolution as provided for in its paragraph 16 and to request that you bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council in accordance with resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.

(Signed) Detlev GRAF ZU RANTZAU
Ambassador

Annex

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS ACTION ON YUGOSLAVIA

[Original: English/French/
Russian/Spanish]

The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,

1. Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on the conflict in Yugoslavia;

2. Recalling its strong support for the activities undertaken by the European Community and its member States, in particular the mandate given to them to organize a monitoring mission, including other interested CSCE participating States;

3. Stating that the conflict in Yugoslavia has led to a situation where principles and provisions of CSCE documents and the Charter of the United Nations are constantly violated and international peace and security threatened;

4. Stressing the need for complementary action by all organizations which can make a contribution to solving the crisis in Yugoslavia;

5. Recalling its resolution "The situation in Yugoslavia" adopted on 22 October 1991 stating its support for the continuing efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

6. Notes with satisfaction that all parties in Yugoslavia have called for the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation as soon as possible;

7. Warmly welcomes the activities of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

8. Strongly supports Security Council resolution 721 (1991) unanimously adopted on 27 November 1991;

9. Calls upon all participating States to support and, where possible, to participate in the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, once agreed upon by the Security Council;

10. Emphasizes that the stationing of peace-keeping forces must not in any way endorse the seizure of territory by force;

11. Welcomes the undertaking by the Security Council to examine and take appropriate action without delay upon the recommendations of the Secretary-General;

12. Strongly appeals to all parties in Yugoslavia to fully comply with the cease-fire agreed upon on 23 November 1991 at Geneva as one of the prerequisites for the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation;

13. Expresses the hope that the Security Council will consider taking further measures to promote a swift solution of the conflict in Yugoslavia;

14. Reiterates its strong commitment to the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia, as the forum where the Yugoslav crisis will have to be solved;

15. Decides to continue to keep the crisis in Yugoslavia under closest consideration and invites the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials to convene the Committee at a time he deems appropriate;

16. Requests the Chairman to transmit this text to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to inform the Security Council in accordance with resolution 713 (1991).

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30 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 June 1991-30 November 1991)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June to 30 November 1991 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 697 (1991) of 14 June 1991, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 30 November 1991.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 697 (1991). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, para. 7, and footnote 37).

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1991:

	Military personnel		
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry Battalion UNAB	388	
	Military Police Company	10	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The Second Battalion The Royal Canadian Regiment	538	
	Signal Squadron	14	
	Military Police Company	11	575
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry Battalion, DANCON 56	323	
	Military Police Company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military Police Company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force Scout Car Squadron, A Squadron, 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own)	109	
	4th Royal Tank Regiment	339	
	UNFICYP Support Regiment	45	
	Engineer Detachment	8	
	Signal Squadron	53	
	Army Aviation Flight	18	
	Transport Squadron	103	
	Medical Centre	5	
	Ordnance Detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military Police Company	9	755
			2 103
	Civilian police		
Australia		20	
Sweden		18	38
Total UNFICYP			2 141

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4. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Clive Milner.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

5. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 (see S/15812, para. 14) continued to be applied, except for occasional difficulties experienced by UNFICYP. Long-standing efforts to increase UNFICYP's freedom of movement in the northern part of the island have remained unsuccessful.

6. On a few occasions, both sides stopped UNFICYP vehicles and personnel when they were crossing the cease-fire line into the United Nations buffer zone. In addition, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference from troops of both sides when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or not frequently patrolled. In particular, the Turkish Forces continued to protest when UNFICYP patrolled closer than 200 metres to their cease-fire line. In some cases UNFICYP movement was restricted in these areas and weapons were pointed at its personnel. UNFICYP continued to protest to the authorities of both sides, reiterating its right to complete access to and freedom of movement in all parts of the buffer zone.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

7. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

8. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 150 observation posts, 51 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

9. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise civilian activities in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British engineers maintain these tracks in a workable condition but with considerable effort and difficulty.

10. The project to clear mines in certain parts of the buffer zone (see S/21981, para. 12, and S/22665, para. 11), where members of UNFICYP as well as civilians are at risk, had to be cancelled because of objections raised by the Turkish Forces.

11. During the period under review UNFICYP agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area in the buffer zone, on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming. However, in August 1991, despite strong protests from UNFICYP, the National Guard re-laid the minefield. The Government of Cyprus has now agreed to remove the mines.

12. The number of cease-fire violations remained at a low level and both sides showed considerable restraint and discipline. There were only two incidents, one by each side, where deliberate shots were fired. Both sides subsequently apologized and informed UNFICYP that disciplinary action was being taken against those responsible for the incidents.

13. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, with only a few minor violations by both sides. UNFICYP continues its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, particularly in areas where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other.

14. There were 11 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish Forces aircraft and 14 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 5 overflights from the north and 14 from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for one other overflight.

15. The National Guard programme of construction at its defensive positions all along its cease-fire line continued, although to a lesser degree, and remained a contentious issue which at times caused an increase in tension. The Turkish Forces continued to call for the work to be stopped. UNFICYP expressed reservations about some of the construction and complained about the National Guard's failure to advise it beforehand of upcoming work. The National Guard maintained that the works were in the area under its control and in no way violated the status quo.

16. There were no significant incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. However, UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continued to be restricted by the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces. As I have reported to the Security Council before, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha (S/18880, para. 28). This position has been reiterated to the the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions.

17. Near Kokkina and Famagusta, UNFICYP has defined a maritime security line restricting, for reasons of safety, the movement of boats in the seaward extension of the buffer zone. There were again violations of the security line by Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats and UNFICYP protested these to

the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus police. UNFICYP also recommended to both sides that they warn fishermen and tourists of the danger involved and advise them of the location of the buffer zone and its seaward extension.

18. Once again, unauthorized hunting by Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone caused safety and security problems for UNFICYP. UNFICYP continued its efforts to work out a practical arrangement with the Cyprus Government authorities to solve this problem.

19. Both sides again conveyed to me their concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. In this connection, I wish to recall my reports of 2 December 1986 (S/18491, para. 22) and of 29 May 1987 (S/18880, paras. 21-23). I remain very concerned about the strength and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation creates tension and increases the risk of serious incidents.

20. The Government of Cyprus complained again to the United Nations about the reported destruction of the Cypriot cultural heritage in the northern part of the island. On my instruction, UNFICYP raised this question with the Turkish Cypriot authorities. During the reporting period, complaints were also made that Turkish Cypriots were using the Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas for non-religious purposes. UNFICYP's investigation proved these allegations to be unfounded.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

21. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP continued to facilitate economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, UNFICYP continued to encourage farming and small commercial activities in the buffer zone.

22. UNFICYP continued to assist both communities in regard to the supply of electricity and water from one part of the island to the other. As a result of cooperation between the two authorities, electric power disruptions were kept to a minimum.

23. Water supplies on the island remained at critically low levels; water restrictions therefore remained in effect across the island. Because of the water shortages, UNFICYP continued to monitor progress on dam projects on both sides of the buffer zone. Working through UNFICYP, water officials of both sides ensured the fair distribution of this valuable natural resource. However, major problems of mutual concern remained. In order to ensure a long term and coordinated approach to this serious island-wide issue, UNFICYP offered to sponsor inter-communal water board meetings and strongly encouraged those responsible to participate in them.

24. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now 564, of whom 560 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 4 live in

Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these Greek Cypriots and in this regard delivered to them 353 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross. UNFICYP continued to carry out the arrangements for the delivery of mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire lines. It also delivered social welfare and pension benefits to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus.

25. UNFICYP personnel interviewed, in private, Greek Cypriots who had applied for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Seven such permanent transfers took place during the reporting period. In the same period UNFICYP also facilitated 510 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas area to the southern part of the island.

26. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to the Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. During these visits, UNFICYP enjoyed unrestricted freedom of action which helped members of the Turkish Cypriot community to maintain contact with their relatives in the north. UNFICYP arranged 20 family reunions involving 98 persons at the Ledra Palace Hotel, and continued to distribute pension benefits to Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

27. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 258. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging contact between Maronites living on the island. UNFICYP also delivered to them approximately 156 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

28. UNFICYP continued to provide frequent emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to civilian members of both communities. When the need arose, UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the south and regularly delivered medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community.

29. UNFICYP continued its efforts to facilitate relations between the communities in the mixed village of Pyla located in the buffer zone. Pressure by the authorities on both sides greatly contributed to the turning of routine issues into difficult problems which, in turn, occasionally increased the tensions between the communities. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road outside the buffer zone continued to block trade and tourism, severely disrupting the economic life of the village. UNFICYP has on a number of occasions requested that this obstacle be removed.

30. The Turkish Cypriot project to install telephones in the homes of the Turkish Cypriot villagers in Pyla has been temporarily suspended. UNFICYP will continue its efforts for the effective and timely resolution of this humanitarian issue.

31. The minaret on the mosque in the village of Pyla was completed. Despite a Turkish Cypriot agreement to confine the height to 18 metres it was built to

the original specifications of 24 metres. UNFICYP protested this breach of agreement, but both communities have accepted the situation.

32. UNFICYP cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus. UNHCR supported bicommunal projects such as sewage, medical care and rehabilitation of the handicapped, emergency medical care and environmental matters. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

33. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions (fifty-second to fifty-sixth), consisting of 18 meetings, of which 12 were attended by the three members of the Committee and their assistants and 6 were attended solely by the three members. The Committee continued its discussions on reports by both sides and on its investigations in the field. A number of new cases were also submitted to the Committee. At the outset of its fifty-fourth session, on 4 September, the Committee issued a communiqué in which it addressed, inter alia, the delicate problem of informing the interested families when its investigations brought to light information about individual missing persons.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

34. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 December 1991, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at $15.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I.	Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
	Movement of contingents	290
	Operational expenses	1 722
	Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	742
	Rations	965
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 231
	Death and disability	100
	Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
	Total I	7 300
II.	Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
	Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
	Contingent-owned equipment	700
	Total II	8 100
	Grand total (I and II)	15 400

35. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

36. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force that is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, Member States have contributed only $3.4 million against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to June 1981. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $186.1 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

37. In my report of 8 October 1991 (S/23121), I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 11 October, the Council adopted resolution 716 (1991).

VII. OBSERVATIONS

38. During the past six months, UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult circumstances.

39. I regret that the political climate on the island has not improved to the point where UNFICYP's initiatives to promote a return to normal conditions could progress unimpeded. The cancellation of the demining project in the buffer zone (para. 11 above) is a case in point. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Government of Canada for its willingness to contribute both human and material resources to this project. The Government of Cyprus' offer of a significant financial contribution is also gratefully acknowledged.

40. It is my view that the two communities could make better use of UNFICYP's ability to promote and facilitate greater contact between them. This useful function flows from the Force's mandate to promote a return to normal conditions on the island and will receive more emphasis in the future.

41. On my instructions, the authorities on both sides in Cyprus have been made aware of my concerns about the situation in Pyla and my view that the bicommunal nature of the village demands special cooperation and understanding by both sides. It is of fundamental importance that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot village Mukhtars be allowed to work together without outside interference so that they can exercise the full range of their responsibilities in village affairs. I therefore appeal to both sides to refrain from interfering in local activities in Pyla. UNFICYP will continue to fulfil its mandate to restore normal conditions by providing all possible assistance to effective cooperation between the two Mukhtars. UNFICYP will exercise more actively its responsibility for resolving contested issues in the village by facilitating practical solutions based on strictly humanitarian criteria.

42. In the prevailing circumstances, I have no doubt that the continued presence of the Force in the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

43. In making this recommendation, I must again stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes a most unfair

burden on the troop-contributing countries. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. In my report of 15 October 1991 (S/23144) on the financing of UNFICYP, I have formally reiterated my belief that the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis would be for the United Nations share of the costs of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 682 (1990) of 21 December 1990, the Secretariat has cooperated actively with the Security Council in its deliberations on this issue and identified a new method of defining and rationalizing extra and extraordinary costs. Should the Council decide to move the Force to assessed contributions, the Governments concerned have agreed to reduce their claims by some 29 per cent. It is my hope that the Council will seize this opportunity to place UNFICYP on a sound and secure financial footing.

44. I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support that they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Governments that have contributed towards the financing of the Force.

45. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilión, to the Force Commander, Major General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场, 简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
Force Scout Car Sqn (-)
UN HP Coy (-)
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Sqn
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Sqn
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy (-)
One Coy
One Engr Tp
HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
HQ & SP Coy
One Engr Sect
One Coy
Two Recce Sects
One Ferret Tp
MP Det
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Pl
One Coy (-)
SECTOR 1
UNCIVPOL Stn
SECTOR 3
One Coy
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
MP Det
One Pl
One Pl
Ferret Tp
Coy (-)
SECTOR 4
MP Det
UNCIVPOL Stn
One Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
One Pl
One Coy (-)
Ferret Tp
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
KYRENIA
NICOSIA
FAMAGUSTA
LARNACA
PAPHOS
LIMASSOL
انتشار قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ١٩٩١
一九九一年十一月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1991
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1991
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА НОЯБРЬ 1991
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVIEMBRE DE 1991
خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Lineas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Lineas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 29 UNITED NATIONS
NOVEMBER 1991